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Abstract—A method to determine entry points and paths of
DDoS attack traffic flows into network domains is proposed. We
determine valid source addresses seen by routers from sampled
traffic under non-attack conditions. Under attack conditions,
we detect route anomalies by determining which routers have
been used for unknown source addresses to construct the attack
paths. We show results from simulations to detect the routers
carrying attack traffic in the victim’s network domain. Our
approach is non-intrusive, not requiring any changes to the
Internet routers and data packets. Precise information regarding
the attack is not required allowing a wide variety of DDoS attack
detection techniques to be used. The victim is also relieved
from the traceback task during an attack. Our algorithm
is simple and efficient, allowing for a fast traceback and the
method is scalable due to the distribution of processing workload.
Index Terms—Distributed Denial of Service, IP Traceback.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current networks do not usually perform any form of
authentication on the source IP address. This is exploited by
many Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks [1], where
the attackers use spoofed source addresses to hide their identity
and location. Some service providers do perform ingress
filtering at access routers to check for valid source IP , but this
is not completely effective. The Spoofer Internet-wide active
measurement Project [2] concluded in 2005 that approximately
360 million addresses and 4600 autonomous systems were vul-
nerable to spoofing, and concerted attacks employing spoofing
remain a serious concern. In 2006, backscatter analysis [3] was
conducted where attack traffic using IP spoofing was captured.
It shows that over a period of 3 years from 2001 to 2004,
22 collected distinct traces revealed 68,700 attacks on over
34,700 distinct Internet hosts. Traceback mechanisms [4-14]
have been proposed to trace the true source of the attackers
to stop the attack at the point nearest to its source in order
to reduce waste of network resources and to try to find the
identity of the attackers in order to prosecute or take other
actions against them.
In infrastructure traceback schemes, the network is responsi-
ble for generating and evaluating traceback state information
to construct the attack graph of the routers through which
attack traffic is passing. In IP Logging [4], intermediate routers
log the invariant portion of the IP header (20 bytes) and the
first 8 bytes of the payload of all IP packets. Hashing is
then performed on the 28-byte information obtained above,
followed by a Bloom filter processing to reduce the storage
requirement. The logs are retrieved from various routers when
traceback for the path taken by any single IP packet is initiated.
Given a copy of an attack packet, and an approximate time of
receipt, it is, in theory, possible to generate a similar hash and
search router logs to determine the attack graph. However the
overheads of generating and storing even a 28 byte hash can
be rather high so IP Logging is not done in most networks.
In the end host traceback schemes, potential victim hosts
maintain the traceback state information. In IP Marking [5,
9-11, 13, 14], intermediate routers along the path taken by the
packets mark their addresses into the packet with a predefined
probability. The victim of the attack can then examine the
information found in the attack packets so as to construct the
attack path. In ICMP Traceback (ITrace) [6], an intermediate
router probabilistically generates an ITrace message for each
IP packet it processes, and sends it to the same final destination
of the IP packet. The victim of the attack can therefore use the
ITrace messages to construct the attack path. Various enhance-
ments have been proposed to ITrace to improve performance
[7, 8, 12], which are discussed in more detail in section 6.
However, all the above-mentioned traceback schemes require
that the attack packets are distinguishable from legitimate
packets. This is due to the need for the identification of
an attack signature in the packets to initiate and perform
traceback. IP marking and ITrace (and its variants) also require
changes to be made to the routers to allow for participation in
the traceback process.
Standard routing protocols perform packet forwarding based
on the destination IP address in the packets so packets belong-
ing to a particular source-destination pair follow a relatively
static path as routing tables are not updated very frequently
under normal conditions. When an attacker spoofs a legitimate
user’s source address, the packet may pass through routers
which are not on the normal source-destination routing path
and this anomaly can be used to determine the attack path.
Our method builds and maintains caches of valid source
addresses for routers in the network from sampled traffic under
non-attack conditions. Under attack conditions, we determine
which routers have been used for unknown source addresses to
construct the attack graph within an administrative domain. We
propose two approaches of our scheme: Network Segmentation
Based (NSB) and Strategic Points Based (SPB). In the NSB
scheme, the network is segmented, routers in each segment
are assigned to the distributed White List (WL) Caching
Device and the Traceback Manager consolidates information
received from these devices to generate the attack graph. In
the SPB scheme, instead of covering the whole network, traffic
sampling is performed in strategic routers in the network
where incoming and outgoing traffic will definitely traverse.
Therefore, the number of sampling points and packets are
reduced, resulting in reduction of processing workload and
overhead traffic. Thus the Traceback Manager and WL caching
device functionalities can co-exist in the same system, elimi-
nating the need for information dissemination. We have also
defined an extension for inter-domain support to identify the
network point nearest to the attack source. The strengths of this
scheme are its scalability due to the distribution of processing
workload and speed due to the simple computation for the
attack graph construction. The elimination of the need to
make modifications to the routers, victim and data packets
to support traceback, unlike existing techniques, allow the
scheme to be “non-intrusive”. This scheme supports the tracing
of both internal (e.g. zombies within the victim network)
and external attackers. In addition, we analysed the scheme,
proposed enhancements to it and considered the deployment
issues.
Section 2 of the paper presents the design objectives and
key assumptions. Section 3 describes our traceback scheme.
Section 4 discusses about the deployment considerations.
Simulations conducted are presented in Section 5. Discussions
on security threats and limitations of our method are covered
in Section 6. Section 7 provides the related work and compar-
isons with existing techniques, followed by the conclusions in
Section 8.
II. DESIGN OBJECTIVES AND KEY ASSUMPTION
A. Design Objectives
Our design is based on the following objectives.
• As changes to the Internet infrastructure raise confor-
mance issues, modifications to the Internet infrastructure
should not be required.
• Methods, such as IP Marking [5, 9-11, 13, 14], require
information to be placed in the original data packets.
However, as there is no unused field in the IP packets,
fields reserved for other purposes, such as the identifi-
cation field for fragmentation, have to be used instead.
This could result in overwriting existing information and
packet corruption, so changes to the original data packets
should not be required.
• During a DDoS attack, the victim would be overwhelmed
due to the attack traffic being received. Therefore, no
additional “burden” should be placed on the victim when
performing traceback during an attack.
• Simple and fast algorithms for tracing of routers carrying
attack traffic are necessary to identify the furthest attack
source points when an attack is ongoing so as to carry
out mitigation. [15] showed that 50% and 80% of attacks
last for less than 10 and 30 minutes, respectively.
• Traceback mechanisms are triggered by attack detection
mechanisms. Existing schemes require precise informa-
tion on the attack packets, such as attack signatures, to
differentiate between legitimate and attack packets and
retrieve traceback information from the latter. As brute-
force DDoS attacks could flood the victim with seemingly
legitimate traffic, identifying an attack signature of the
data packets may not be possible so should not be a pre-
requisite for the traceback methods.
B. Key Assumption
Our design makes the key assumption that end-to-end
routes are relatively stable. Analysis of 40000 end-to-end
route measurements conducted using repeated “traceroutes”
between 37 Internet sites, collected is reported in [16]. Two
distinct views of route stability, prevalence and persistence,
were studied. Prevalence refers to probability that a certain
route is encountered (if a route is observed, how probable are
we to observe it again in the future). Persistence refers to the
routes often remain unchanged over a long period of time (if a
route is observed at time t, how long before it may change). In
[16], routes were reduced to 3 different levels of granularity,
namely host (each route as a sequence of Internet hostnames),
city (as a sequence of geographical cities), and AS (as a
sequence of Autonomous Systems). Prevalence of a dominant
route (i.e. it appears most often) is computed as the ratio of
the number of times the dominant route is observed to the
total number of traceroutes measuring a particular path. The
median value of prevalence is 82%, 97% and 100% at host,
city and AS granularity respectively. Therefore, in general, it
was concluded that Internet paths were strongly dominated
by a single route. It was shown that the time periods over
which routes persist demonstrate a wide variation, ranging
from seconds to days. However, about 2/3 of the Internet paths
had routes persisting for either days or weeks.
Routing stability based on data captured from the National
Internet Measurement Infrastructure (NIMI) and a set of
189 public traceroute servers was studied in [17]. Of the
NIMI paths, 78% always exhibited the same route, and 86%
of the routes had a prevalence of 90% or higher. For the
public servers, the corresponding figures are 73% and 85%
respectively. It was shown that very often, routes persist for at
least a day, but in general, 1/3 of the Internet routes and 1/6
of the NIMI routes are short-lived.
A study in 2002 [18] investigated whether routing fluctua-
tions caused by the instability of the small fraction of Internet
routes affect a significant portion of the Internet traffic. It was
concluded that the vast majority of Internet routing instability
stems from only a small number of unpopular destinations.
Popular destinations, which are responsible for the bulk of the
Internet, were shown to have remarkably stable routes lasting
days or weeks at times, probably due to the fact that they have
reliable and well-managed connections to the Internet.
The above studies showed that the Internet routes exhibit
relatively high stability in terms of prevalence and persistence
for the need of our scheme (i.e. routes should not change
erratically and frequently so that the cached information in
the white list becomes obsolete). Therefore, we can assume
that Internet routes taken by the data packets under normal
conditions are generally stable.
III. NETWORK DOMAIN ENTRYPOINT/PATH
DETERMINATION
In Figure 1, we show that if node A spoofs node B’s address,
an “incorrect” path via anomalous intermediate routers can be
detected as B to C traffic should flow through R3 and R4, not
R1 and R2. By performing source IP address validation checks
on whether transit packets are supposed to arrive at particular
routers, these packets could be identified as from legitimate
or illegitimate users, with a low false positive rate (studied in
later section). Therefore, even in the event that DDoS attacks
constitute seemingly legitimate packets, they would still be
traceable.
Figure 1: Route Anomaly
In our scheme, the routers in the network send sampled
transit traffic flow information, using standard flow sampling
and reporting mechanisms such as Netflow [19], PSAMP [20-
22], and IPFIX [23, 24], to their assigned White List (WL)
caching device. The flow information includes the source
address and port, destination address and port in the original
data packets, and the packet’s next hop address. In the cache,
each record will consist of the above fields, the address of the
router that sent the export and time of receipt.
The WL caching devices will update the white lists for
the routers during the learning stage (i.e. when there is no
ongoing DDoS attack). Therefore, spoofed source addresses
are prevented from being included in the caches. We assume
a DDoS attack would be detected using mechanisms such as
TCP SYN flood [25], or MULTOPS [26].
During the attack, traffic sampling at the routers continues
and this information is sent to the WL caching devices.
However, the white list generation and updates are suspended
upon attack detection. The WL caching devices search for
mismatches between the sampled traffic and cache data (i.e.
flows from previously seen sources going through wrong
routers which indicate spoofed addresses), and generate partial
attack graphs which are sent to the Traceback Manager to
generate the full attack graphs. We propose two approaches
of our traceback scheme: Network Segmentation Based (NSB)
and Strategic Points Based (SPB), presented as follows:
A. Network Segmentation Based (NSB) Approach
In the NSB approach, the network in an administrative
domain is divided into segments. Each segment of routers
is assigned a WL caching device. During an attack, the
Traceback Manager queries the WL caching devices by re-
questing them to check for specific source/destination ad-
dress pairs. The WL caching devices send information to
the Traceback Manager as to whether the flows with the
specified source/destination address pairs have passed through
the routers they are in charge of, and if these flows are
expected or anomalous. This approach is useful in the case of
DDoS attacks whereby the attack signature or attack pattern
is identifiable. The detection mechanisms are signature-based
and are able to distinguish between legitimate and attack
traffic. They are then able to provide information regarding
the suspicious source/destination address pairs. However, in
the event that attack traffic constitutes seemingly legitimate
packets, an attack signature would not be present. This short-
coming is similar to the existing traceback mechanisms which
require distinguishing between legitimate and attack packets to
conduct tracing. Another problem is the wide range of spoofed
addresses and the chosen source/destination address might
not have been captured by all the routers during sampling.
Therefore, a set of suspicious source/destination address pairs
has to be determined. Nevertheless, this method allows for fast
mismatch checking in the event that such attack information
is available.
Another solution is to rely on the continuous arrival of
flow exports from the routers at the WL caching devices
during an attack stage to perform traceback. The WL caching
devices will perform checking to identify traffic flows which
are not supposed to arrive at the routers they are in charge
of (i.e. performing router address, traffic’s source address and
destination address matching checks against the white lists).
The WL caching devices will then construct partial attack
graphs based on these anomalies observed and send them to
the Traceback Manager. The Traceback Manager will proceed
to perform the complete attack graph generation.
In this case, some routers may see packets from new
sources that are not in their white lists which are legitimate
requests rather than attack packets. However, such legitimate
requests would constitute a relatively minimal percentage of
mismatches in comparison to the attack traffic. In the case
of attack traffic going through a router, an excessive high
number of mismatches would be observed due to the wide
range of spoofed addresses and high volume of attack traffic.
However, if the attack traffic does not pass through a particular
router, the observed number of unknown source addresses due
to new legitimate requests will be comparatively small. Our
solution is to set a percentage threshold on the number of
‘unknown’ source addresses seen by a particular router to take
into consideration new legitimate requests.
We present an example scenario in Figure 2, where we as-
sume the legitimate and attack traffic enter the network through
different ingress routers so as to simplify the explanation. We
will present simulation scenarios of mixed traffic coming in
through ingress routers, in Section 5. As shown, the legitimate
traffic is coming from addresses IP1 to IP120. Of these, IP1
to IP100 have visited the site before the attack, whereas
IP101 to IP120 are new legitimate requests. Therefore, the
WL Caching Device 1 would only have records of IP1-
IP100/victim address pairs. Although, mismatches were also
observed by WL Caching Device 1 corresponding to Router
(R) 1 and R3 “being asked” to forward packets belonging to
flows from unknown sources, the number of these mismatches
is extremely small.
Figure 2: Network Segmentation Based Approach
In the example, the attackers are spoofing the source address
of the packets using a wide address range from IP1 to IP10000.
Therefore, R2, R4, R5 and R6 would see a sharp rise in the
number of new traffic flows. WL Caching Device 1 and 2 will
observe a high number of mismatches for the sampled traffic
from these routers to the victim. They will then construct
the partial attack graphs of R5->R6 and R2->R4 respectively,
and send these graphs to the Traceback Manager for forming
the complete attack graph. In addition, we assume that the
Traceback Manager has knowledge of the network topology
and the entry and exit points of the network.
B. Strategic Points Based (SPB) Approach
One of the main goals of conducting traceback is to locate
the points closest to the attack sources so as to carry out miti-
gation such as effective filtering or rate-limiting. Therefore,
instead of having coverage of all routers within a domain
such as a campus network, it would suffice to identify the
strategic points, where incoming and outgoing traffic will
definitely traverse, and perform monitoring on them instead.
In this approach, we study 2 main scenarios to pin-point
the strategic points. We classify attackers into internal (e.g.
zombies within the victim network) and external attackers.
To trace external attackers, the strategic points to perform
monitoring or traffic sampling would be at the ingress routers.
However, for the internal attackers, we have to know the
network topology. We group the internal nodes as intermediate
routers and access routers. Monitoring is conducted on the
group of access routers.
By reducing the number of routers participating in the
traffic sampling and flow exporting, the workload and over-
head traffic is significantly reduced. This is a very important
enhancement considering that traceback is to be performed
during the occurrence of a DDoS attack whereby the victim’s
network is under heavy load. Another advantage of this
approach is that due to the small number of routers involved, a
single Traceback Manager with built-in WL caching device’s
functionalities could be in charge of the whole network,
therefore consolidating the information storage and processing
at a central point. This would allow faster processing and a
global view of the traffic flows in the domain, making it easier
to identify anomalous flows.
IV. DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Our method allows for inter-domain support for both the
NSB and SPB approaches. In the case of NSB, after construc-
tion of the attack graph at the Traceback Manager, it is able
to identify the entry point/s of the attack traffic flows into
the network. It would then communicate with the Traceback
Manager/s of those networks with connecting traffic to these
entry point/s, sending them information of the victim’s IP
address. Assuming these networks can perform traceback, the
same attack graph construction process will be carried out at
these networks and the completed graph will be sent back to
the Traceback Manager at the victim network. This facilitates
tracing to the nearest possible point to the source of the
attack. In the case of SPB, the similar function performed by
the WL caching device is built into the Traceback Manager.
Instead of the whole attack graph, the Traceback Manager
of the co-operating networks only reports the ingress points
in their networks, where attack traffic flows are detected.
Therefore, SPB would be a more feasible solution as co-
operating networks would not have to disclose their internal
network topology.
Our traceback method is non-intrusive, in that it does
not require changes to the routers assisting in the traceback
process. Built-in traffic sampling/monitoring and exporting
tools in routers such as Netflow [19], PSAMP [20-22] and
IPFIX [23, 24] are used to sample and report the required
information to the WL caching devices. If such tools are not
built in the routers, we can instead make use of monitoring
devices by installing them along the network paths.
If the learning process is not suspended in time, records
of the attack traffic flow might make it into the white list,
thereby corrupting it. The decision as to when to stop the
learning process is dependent on the DDoS attack detection
mechanism, as it triggers traceback. A solution is to create a
separate buffer for the white list. Records of sampled traffic
are first written in to the buffer. The interval for the buffer
to confirm entries into the white list cache would then be
based on the attack detection speed. For example, if the attack
detection mechanism takes x secs to detect an attack and the
triggering delay (i.e. time to inform Traceback Manager of
the attack) takes y secs, the buffer flushing interval would be
x+y secs for the SPB scheme. For the NSB scheme, we would
also need to take into account the time taken for the Traceback
Manager to inform the WL caching devices of the attack.
Another important issue is when do we reactivate the learn-
ing process, as we have to make sure that only legitimate traffic
is present? Therefore, the detection mechanism which detects
the attack and triggers traceback or the response mechanism
responsible for mitigating the attack has to ensure that the
attack has stopped or successfully mitigated, to trigger the
reactivation of the learning process.
The size of the white list is an important issue to be
considered during deployment. For NSB, although all routers
are to be monitored, we distribute the work load across
multiple WL caching devices. In SPB, the number of routers
to be monitored is significantly cut down to allow the use of a
single WL cache on the Traceback Manager. As an estimation
of the white list size, we referred to [27] which shows that
Amazon.com experienced 630,000 visitors in a single hour on
its busiest day in 2003. By having a white list cache for a
protected server in an IPv4 network, each record would take
up 8 bytes of storage (i.e. 4 bytes for the source address and
another 4 bytes for the router). This converts to 2.4MB of
storage for white list containing the past half hour of records.
V. SIMULATIONS AND EXPERIMENTS
Figure 3: Traceback using SPB approach
We have carried out simulations to study the performance of
our traceback method. Due to the advantages of SPB over NSB
approach, we implemented the SPB approach in ns-2 [28] and
investigated the performance of the SPB approach during an
attack. During the learning phase, nodes generate legitimate
traffic to the target/victim and the Traceback Manager builds
the white list. When the attack traffic is started, the white
list updating is suspended and traceback is started, but the
legitimate nodes continue to generate traffic at a probability (to
simulate random traffic). The attackers spoof source addresses
of the attack packets based on a range which also includes the
legitimate nodes.
The network topology is shown in Figure 3. We have 100
attackers (A1 to A100) and 120 legitimate nodes (N1 to
N120). The attackers send attack traffic with randomly spoofed
addresses in the range of 1 to 10000 (which includes the
addresses of the legitimate nodes). The strategic points are R1,
R2, R3 and R4, which are the entry points to the network.
The links from the legitimate nodes and the attackers into
the network are set to 10Mbps with a propagation delay of
30ms to reflect the Internet delays. The internal links are set
to 100Mbps with a propagation delay of 10ms.
During the learning phase, each legitimate node N1 to N100,
sent traffic to the victim V, at the rate of 5 pkts/sec. R1 to R4
sampled this traffic with probability 0.01 and sent sampled data
to the Traceback Manager. The learning period was 20 secs.
We ran 3 sets of simulations where the attack started at the
20th sec with rates of 20, 50 or 100 pkts/sec, per attack node.
During the 1.5 sec long attack, all legitimate nodes (including
N101 to N120 which were simulating new legitimate requests)
generated traffic with a “decide to send” probability1 of 0.5 at
a rate of 5 pkts/sec per node.
R1 and R3 were successfully detected to be carrying attack
traffic. Table 1 shows the statistics of the number of mismatch
packets traversing the routers detected by the Traceback Man-
ager. The time stated is from the start of the attack and the
results are displayed as RX(Y), where X refers to the router’s
ID and Y refers to the number of mismatch packets detected.
The time, t, taken to first detect mismatch packets for both R1
and R3, was 140ms, 80ms and 70ms for attack rates of 20, 50
and 100 pkts/sec, respectively. At t ms, a total of 3, 3 and 4
sampled packets were received by the Traceback Manager, of
which 2, 2 and 3 were mismatch packets, for the attack rates
of 20, 50 and 100 pkts/sec, respectively.
Table 1: Mismatched packets
The results show that there were false positives detected. R2
(for attack rate of 100 pkts/sec) and R4 (for both attack rates of
20 and 50 pkts/sec) were detected to be carrying attack traffic
due to mismatch packets detected. These mismatch packets
were sampled from the new legitimate traffic not found in
the white list. We also observe that as time progresses, false
positives started appearing (e.g. 1 mismatch packet for R4
at 0.5 sec when attack rate is 50 pkts/sec). However, the
difference between the number of mismatch packets sampled
for R1,R3 and R2,R4 widens too. At 0.5 sec, the smallest-
gap ratio (worst case) was 1/10. At 1.6 sec (measurement
taken at 1.6 sec to wait for packets due to propagation delay
even though attack was stopped at 1.5th sec), the smallest-gap
ratio was 1/15, 1/18 and 1/73 for attack rates of 20, 50 and
100 pkts/sec. Threshold values can be set so that these false
positives are ignored.
The system was implemented in an experimental testbed
within the EU funded Diadem Firewall project [29]. However
even though a major internet service provider was one of
the partners, we were unable to install the system within a
1Legitimate traffic during attack is generated at 5 pkts/sec. However, a
random generator is used to determine whether to generate each packet, with
a probability of 0.5.
large operational network as the service provider would not
permit any DDOS attacks in their network. We used a rather
unrealistic small scale test system which indicated reasonable
traceback times of a few seconds and that the system could be
implemented and integrated with router monitoring elements.
VI. THREAT ANALYSIS AND LIMITATIONS
In this section, we consider the security issues and limita-
tions of our method.
A. Security Considerations
1) Spoofing of IPFIX packets: An attacker might imper-
sonate a monitoring element to send IPFIX packets
to the collector to inject spoofed addresses into the
white list. Subsequent DDoS attack packets, using these
addresses, can traverse entry points without being identi-
fied by the Traceback mechanism. However, the attacker
would need to know the path the attack packets will
be taking and also what are the identification numbers
or IP addresses of the monitoring elements. Another
objective might be to corrupt the white list so as to
let Traceback wrongly identify an entry point which
is allowing in legitimate traffic and cause self-inflicted
DoS. IPFIX packets from illegitimate sources should
be prevented from being entered into the white list by
using authenticated associations between the monitoring
elements and the collector.
2) Spoofing traffic during learning: Before launching an
attack, an attacker might send traffic with spoofed source
addresses at a normal rate in order to get these into
the white list. These IP addresses could then be used in
future attacks and would not be detected as anomalies as
they are in the white list. A solution would be to monitor
for bi-directional flows with established connections. In
this case, only such flow records would be committed
to the white list.
3) Man-in-the-middle attacks: An on-path attacker could
also act as a Man-in-the-middle to change the contents
of IPFIX packets to insert spoofed addresses in the white
list or corrupt it. Traceback would then fail as a result.
To prevent packet modification, Message Authentication
Codes to validate the integrity of the contents of IPFIX
packets can be used.
4) Eavesdropping attacks: On-path attackers can eaves-
drop unencrypted traceback traffic to determine what
addresses are going through which entry points. At-
tackers could then be given legitimate addresses to use
as spoofed addresses. The attackers would have to be
chosen so that the traffic always enters via the “correct”
entry point. Encryption such as IPSec ESP, could be
used to guard the confidentiality of the data.
5) Replay attacks: Studies have shown end-to-end Internet
routes to be relatively stable. However, in the event
of router failures, new routes would be chosen for
packet delivery instead. Therefore, the white list would
be updated by the IPFIX packets. An attacker might
attempt to perform a replay of old IPFIX packets and
cause the white list to be corrupted. This threat would
result in legitimate traffic coming in from new routes
being detected as attacks and cause a self-inflicted DoS.
Protection against replay attacks can be achieved by the
use of timestamps or nonce to verify that an IPFIX
packet has been freshly generated. Alternatively, IPSec
could also prevent replay by the use of dynamic keying
if support for automatic key management is present.
6) Resource depletion attack on collector: Malicious flood-
ing of the collector with IPFIX packets to deplete
processing resources can be prevented if the collector
accepts IPFIX packets only from known authenticated
monitoring elements.
7) DDoS on Traceback’s components: Attackers might
carry out direct DDoS attacks on the Traceback’s com-
ponents, such as the monitoring elements and the col-
lector. DDoS detection and response mechanisms could
be used to protect these vital components. Alternatively,
techniques such as port hopping [30] could be used to
switch between ports numbers at predefined time inter-
vals. Since security associations between the monitoring
elements and the collector would already have been set
up, it makes the computation of the current port number
feasible. Ports not in use could be closed while the one
which is dynamically computed and allocated could be
used for communications.
B. Limitations
1) Speed of detecion mechanism: When the detection
mechanism detects the occurrence of a DDoS attack,
Traceback is triggered to stop the learning process and
start the tracing back to the entry points where the attack
traffic is coming in. If this is not done quickly enough,
the white list would be corrupted with the information
from the attack traffic. Therefore, new entries are entered
into a buffer in the Traceback mechanism before being
allowed into the white list. New entries are allowed to
be transferred into the white list only after a time delay
to ensure that no attack traffic is present during this time
interval.
2) Speed of traceback: As Traceback is performed in real-
time (during the occurrence of an attack), it has to obtain
the results before the attack is over. If the attack is too
short, Traceback would be unable to complete if the
speed of tracing is not fast enough. A solution would
be to implement logging to store the attack information
to allow for traceback in the event of short attacks, for
accountability purpose and even for further post-mortem
analysis.
3) Across administrative borders: After Traceback within
the victim’s network domain has been performed, the
results could be passed on to the adjoining administrative
domain, which is forwarding the attack traffic in. The
results could be used for that domain to carry out
further tracing back or simply for informative purpose.
The forms of communications to be used could be se-
cured emails, phone calls or authenticated and encrypted
packets to protect the integrity and confidentiality of
the data. The choice of the form of communication
would depend on the time of the attack, if near real-
time informing is required and whether an automated
information or triggering system and secure link has
been set up between the two networks.
VII. RELATED WORK
In the IP logging scheme, the network routers log the
passage of all IP packets. The key challenge here lies in the po-
tentially huge amount of information storage requirement. For
example, if a router were to log all the packets in its entirety,
each OC-192 link at 1.25 GB/s at the router requires 75 GB of
storage for a 1-minute query buffer. The storage requirement
quickly becomes prohibitive as the number of router links
increases. One solution, SPIE (Source Path Isolation Engine)
[4], has been proposed for IP version 4. The mechanism is
designed to identify the true source of a particular IP packet
given a copy of the packet to be traced and an approximate
time of receipt. In order to take care of the transformation
of packets as they are routed from source to destination, the
mechanism identified the invariant portions of the 20-byte IPv4
header. The fields that are susceptible to changes include: TOS
(Type of Service), TTL (Time to Live), Checksum and Options
field. The logging is based on the invariant portion of the IP
header and the first 8 bytes of payload. Based on the statistics
collected, the 28-byte prefix described above results in a rate
of collision of approximately 0.00092% in WANs and 0.139%
in LANs. To further reduce the storage requirement, instead
of storing the entire 28-byte prefix, hashing is performed,
followed by a Bloom filter processing [31]. This reduces the
memory storage requirement in the router to 0.5% of link
bandwidth per unit time. The disadvantage is that using both
the packets’ digest (instead of the full packet) and hashing
to reduce storage requirement increases the risk of incurring
false positives.
In IP marking [5, 9-11, 13, 14] schemes, the intermediate
routers mark the IP packets with additional information so
that the victim can use them to determine the attack path.
Approaches proposed include node append, node sampling
and edge sampling. The node append mechanism is similar
to the IP Record Route Option [32], in that the addresses
of successive routers traversed by IP packets are appended
to the packets. The victim can thus traceback the source of
such attack packets easily. However, this method introduces
very high overhead in terms of router processing and packet
space. The node sampling approach reduces such overhead by
the probabilistic marking of IP packets. The edge sampling
approach, as its name implies, marks an edge of the network
topology, traversed by the IP packets, instead of just the node.
The IP marking algorithms put the marking information in the
Identification field of the IP header. This type of mechanism
has an inherent disadvantage in that it affects the format of IP
packets (e.g. the Identification field is used for fragmentation
purpose). The standardization of the format for IP marking
also becomes an issue.
In the ICMP Traceback mechanism [6-8, 12], a new ICMP
message type, ICMP Traceback (ITrace), is designed to carry
information on routes that an IP packet has taken. IP Marking
requires overloading some fields in the IP header, which raises
the backward protocol compatibility problem. ICMP Trace-
back utilizes out-of-band messaging to achieve packet tracing.
As an IP packet passes through a router, an ICMP Traceback
message (ITrace) is generated with a low probability of about
1/20000 for the IP packet and sent to the same destination.
Assuming that the average maximum diameter of the Internet
is 20 hops, this probability value is to set the upper bound to
the net increase in the traffic overhead to 0.1%. This ITrace
message is then sent randomly, with a certain probability, to
the destination or to the origin of the IP packet. In the event
of a DDoS attack, the destination node can then use it to
traceback the attack path. The disadvantage of this scheme is
that additional traffic overhead will be incurred.
All these existing traceback schemes require wide-spread
changes to and deployment on Internet routers. Unless stan-
dardization is in place, it will be a long and difficult process
for everyone to decide on the scheme to implement. These
schemes also rely heavily on the detection mechanism not just
to trigger traceback but also to provide them with the original
packet for its route to be traced. This requires the detection
mechanism to identify attack packets or an attack signature.
The IP marking and ICMP Traceback schemes also rely on
the victim to receive the traceback information. This might be
a burden on the victim which is already under a DDoS attack.
IP marking also require changes to be made to the original
data packets and overwriting essential fields might corrupt the
original packets.
In contrast, our approach provides a means for performing
traceback in a non-intrusive way. Changes to the Internet
routers are not required. Constraints are also not placed on
the detection mechanism to provide it with precise information
regarding the attack. The logging and computation tasks are
shifted to the WL caching devices and Traceback Manager,
relieving the victim from additional burden. Changes to the
original data packets are also not required. As the learning
phase is conducted before the attack, once the attack is
detected, mismatch checking can be conducted at once to
determine routers carrying attack traffic. Our algorithm is also
simple and efficient, allowing for a fast generation of the attack
graph and is scalable due to the distribution of processing
workload.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a non-intrusive traceback tech-
nique based on the rationale that packets relating to a particular
source-destination flow follow a relatively static path through
routers. If an attacker spoofs a legitimate user’s address, an
“incorrect” path can then be detected. Our system builds
caches of valid source addresses (white list generation) for
routers at distributed WL caching devices, the construction
of the attack graph within an administrative domain, and
extension for inter-domain support to identify the network
point nearest to the attack source.
We proposed two schemes namely Network Segmentation
Based (NSB) and Strategic Points Based (SPB) schemes. The
first scheme divides the network into different segments with
a WL caching device responsible for each. The second cut
down the number of routers to be monitored and only focus
on the strategic points within the network. Therefore, SPB is
able to achieve the traceback objective while reducing the work
load and overhead. Simulations were conducted based on SPB
performing traceback to locate routers carrying attack traffic
in the scenarios of internal attackers and external attackers.
The sampling rate was set to 0.01. Routers forwarding attack
packets were successfully located by the scheme. For external
attackers, we were able to achieve detection time of 140ms,
80ms and 70ms for attack rate of 20, 50 and 100 pkts/sec.
We also observe that as the attack rate increases, the detec-
tion is faster and the difference in the number of mismatch
packets from attack and new legitimate traffic increases due
to differences in generation rate. This allows a threshold to be
set to ignore low rates of new legitimate traffic. In the case of
internal attackers, the detection time of 130ms was achieved
after 140 attack packets were sent by the attackers.
Due to the differences in the way our system and the
other existing traceback techniques are triggered, quantita-
tive analysis and comparison are not practical. However, we
presented a qualitative analysis comparing our scheme with
other traceback techniques. Our approach is non-intrusive,
not requiring any changes to be made to the Internet routers
and precise information regarding the attack is not required
so we can use a wide variety of DDoS attack detection
techniques. The logging and computation tasks are shifted
to the WL caching devices and Traceback Manager, and
therefore relieving the victim from additional burden. Changes
to the original data packets are also not required. As the
learning phase is conducted before the attack, once the attack
is detected, mismatch checking can be conducted at once to
determine routers carrying attack traffic. Our algorithm is also
simple and efficient, allowing for a fast generation of the attack
graph and is scalable due to the distribution of processing
workload.
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